Emerging Trade Policy Issues: The Hard Choices by Meyers, William H.
CARD Working Papers CARD Reports and Working Papers
2-1986
Emerging Trade Policy Issues: The Hard Choices
William H. Meyers
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Economic Policy Commons, and the International Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CARD Reports and Working Papers at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in CARD Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Meyers, William H., "Emerging Trade Policy Issues: The Hard Choices" (1986). CARD Working Papers. 32.
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers/32
Emerging Trade Policy Issues: The Hard Choices
Abstract
Agricultural trade policy has been receiving increased attention in the United States for the last few years. The
reason is obvious. After a decade during which the value of agricultural exports grew from $8 billion annually
to a peak of nearly $44 billion in 1981, both quantities and values of exports have fallen substantially. Recent
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimates project $43 billion in farm exports in 1985. In the long
history of U.S. Agriculture, exports have often been a major force in agricultural prosperity and distress. It is a
natural tendency therefore, to look at export growth as a solution to the dismal state of the farm economy.
Unfortunately, poor export performance is only one of a complex array of factors that have contributed to the
current distress in agriculture; and many of these factors are jointly related to macroeconomic policies and
performance.
Disciplines
Agricultural and Resource Economics | Agricultural Economics | Economic Policy | International Economics
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers/32
Emerging Trade Policy Issues: 
The Hard Choices 
William H. Meyers 
Working Paper 86-WP 3 
February 1986 
Contents 
Sources of Growth and Decline in Exports 
Factors Influencing World Imports 
Factors Affecting Trade Shares 
Looking to the 1990s 
Trade War or Trade Policy 
Export Subsidies 
Retaliation . 
Trade Policy 
Conclusions 
References . 
List of Tables 
Table 1. 1980s Economic Environment Compared to 1970s 
Table 2. Impact on trade of factors influencing total grain demand 
and U.S. trade shares over three time periods 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. World and U.S. Total Grain Trade ..... . 
Figure 2. Net Imports Growing--wheat and coarse grains 
Figure 3. Net Imports Declining--wheat and coarse grains 
Figure 4. Components of World Grain Trade--wheat and coarse 
gra1ns . . 
Figure 5. Soybean Plus Soybean Equivalent of Meal--Major 
Exporters (1965-1985) .......... . 
2 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
6 
6 
7 
13 
1 
5 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Emerging Trade Policy Issues: T~e Hard Choices 
William H. Meyers 
Agricultural trade policy has been receiving increased attention in the 
United States for the last few years. The reason is obvious. After a 
decade during which the value of agricultural exports grew from $8 billion 
annually to a peak of nearly $44 billion in 1981, both quantities and values 
of exports have fallen substantially. Recent USDA estimates project $32 
billion in farm exports in 1985. In the long history of U.S. agriculture, 
exports have often been a major force in agricultural prosperity and 
distress. It is a natural tendency, therefore, to look at export gruwth as 
a solution to the dismal state of the farm economy. Unfortunately, poor 
export performance is only one of a complex array of factors that have 
contributed to the current distress in agriculture; and many of these 
factors are jointly related to macroeconumic policies and performance. 
The major elements of these changes from the 1970s to the 1980s are 
noted in Table 1. The economic policies that successfully wrung inflation 
out of the U.S. economy also slowed economic growth here and in many fvreign 
countries. U.S. inflation rates fell more rapidly than interest rates, 
causing real rates of interest to rise. The 1981 tax cut reduced goverment 
revenues without an associated cutback in government expenditures, causing 
the federal budget deficit to increase rapidly and put further upward 
Table l. 1980s Economic Environment Compared to 1970s 
19 70s 1980s 
u.s. Inflation Rate (%) 5 to 10 3 to 5 
u.s. Real Intert!st Rate (%) -l to 3 5 to 9 
u.s. Budget Deficit 
($ Billion) -10 to -70 -60 to -180 
u.s. Current Account -20 to 20 5 to -120 
($ Billion) 
u.s. Exchange Rate Change 69 to 80 = -29% 80 to 84 +50% 
Net Debt Transfers to 
Developing Countries 
($ Billion) 78 to 81 30/yr. 82 to 83 -2/yr. 
u.s. Ag Export Changes 
($ Billion) 7l to 81 = 35.8 81 to 85 = -11.8 
u.s. Ag Program Costs 
(~83 Billion) 7l (0 81 = 5/yr. 82 to 85 14/yr. 
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pressure on real rates of interest. As foreign investors bought dollars to 
invest here and earn these high returns, the dollar appreciated and made our 
exports more costly abroad. The decline in exports relative to imports 
created a substantial increase in the current account deficit. The world 
economic slowdown in the early 1980s, combined with high real interest rates 
and an appre~iating dollar, contributed to debt crises in many Third World 
economies. Public and private debt disbursements to developing countries 
declined and debt repayments increased until the net debt transf~rs became 
negative. 
All of these factors contributed to a substantial decline in U.S. 
agri~ultural exports from the peak in 1981. Added to this weak demand, the 
bumper crops in the United States in 1981 and 1982 set the stage for a 
substantial decline in farm pt-ices, incomes, and land values. Corrnnodity 
programs designed to provide a measure of protection to farm prices and 
income absorbed substantial amounts of the growing surplus through building 
stocks and acreage reductions. Program costs rose to nearly three times the 
rate of expenditures incurred during the 1970s. 
The reversal of conditions that existed before the turn of the decade 
could hardly be more complete. Exchange rate changes and export declines 
can be viewed as casualties rather than causes of this turnaround. It 1s 
clear that macroeconomic policies have been a major element in this 
reversal. These large negative impacts of the changed macroeconomic 
policies on agriculture were not anticipated. In fact, some earlier studies 
by Tweeten suggested that expansionary monetary policies were har~ful to 
agriculture. More recent studies by Starleaf, Meyers, and Womack (1985) and 
Devadoss, Meyers, and Starleaf (1985) have provided evidence that farmers 
are adversely affected by the kind of stringent monetary policies that were 
iaitiated in 1979 and carried into the 1980s. 
Before proceeding to discuss trade policy issues that have em~rged from 
this wrenching experience, it is important to look more carefully at the 
patterns of growth and decline in trade that we have experienced. A better 
understanding of the factors underlyiag these changes will make it possible 
to form better judgments about the trade policy issues and options that are 
emerg1ng. 
Sources of Growth and Decline in Exports 
For analytical purposes, it is important to separate two ~ornponents of 
change in U.S. exports. The first is the total world imports of the 
commodity, and the second is the U.S. share of those imports. Separation of 
these two elements helps to distinguish the factors that influence each and 
to determine the prospects for influencing these factors. Figure 1 shows 
the pattern of growth and decline in total grain trade for the world and the 
United States, and the U.S. share. The imports of these commodities nearly 
doubled from 1970 to 1980. The U.S. production machine was able to qui~kly 
respond to this demand growth and increased its share of this trade from 34 
percent in 1970 to a peak level of 52 per~eat in 1979. Much land that was 
idled by government programs in the 1960s was brought back into production, 
cropland and irrigation was expanded, and pruductivity was increased. As a 
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result, U.S. agriculture became more dependent on export demand, which 1s 
far less stable and predictable than U.S. domestic demand. 
In the 1980s it is evident that total grain trade exhibited slight 
variations from year to year but no growth. U.S. exports, however, declined 
and were replaced by exports from competitors including the European 
Community. During this period, the U.S. export share declined to 40 percent 
in 1984 and is expected to be around 38 percent in 1985. Even if the U.S. 
trade share had been maintained at around 50 percent, U.S. exports in the 
1980s would not have experienced any growth. 
Because of the relatively large U.S. share in world trade, it has been 
too easy to think that the world is heavily dependent on us for grain 
supplies. That is true in the short run, but it is important to remember 
that even though our exports now represent about 40 percent of world trade 
in grains, they only represent about 6 percent of world production of these 
commodities. It is clear that in the 1980s the United States is more 
dependent on the world market as a source of demand growth, but the world 
market is not as dependent on the U.S. as a source of supply. 
Factors Influencing World Imports 
The major factors affecting net import demand in the rest of the world 
are the rate of production growth in importing countries and the rate of 
growth income and population- on the demand side. Population marches along 
at a fairly predictable rate, but production growth and economic growch ar~ 
much more variable and subject to policy influences. The net importing 
areas of the world for wheat and coarse grains are divided into nine regions 
in Figures 2 and 3. All of these regions contributed to some degree to the 
growth in import demand in the 1970s, but China, East Europe, and West 
Europe (excluding the European Community) had sharp declines in import 
demand in the 1980s. · 
The most rapid import growth in the 1970s came from these three regions 
plus the USSR and the Upper-Middle Income (UMINC) Developing Countries. 
Japan, the Lower-~iddle Income (LMINC) Developing Countries, and the High 
Income (HINC) Developing Countries show steady rates of growth through the 
entire period. The low income (LINC) developing countries increased imports 
rapidly from 1971 to 1974 but then fell off sharply in the following three 
years and remained fairly flat after that. Two of the three regions where 
imports fell sharply in the 1980s, East Europe and Other West Europe 
(excluding the EC), had large increases in production while utilization was 
fairly constant. In China, utilization increased but production increased 
much more rapidly than domestic consumption, making import substitucion 
possible. While slowing of demand growth is evident in other regions, it 
appears thac a major factor contributing to che stagnant import growth in 
the 1980s is the sharp increase in production experienced in Europe and 
China. 
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Factors Affecting Trade Shares 
Losses in trade share are associated with increased exports of 
competitors. This could be associated with the appreciation of the dollar, 
the price levels supported by loan rates in the United States, or policies 
of competing exporters which induce larger production and/or subsidize 
surplus commodities in export markets. It is clear from Figure 4 that th8 
exports of the United States were increasing more rapdily than its 
competitors from the early 1970s until 1980. Then U.S. exports began to 
decline, while competitor exports continued to grow. A very similar pattern 
is evident in Figure 5 for soybeans and the soybean equivalent of meal. 
Note that the turnaround in U.S. exports is coincident with the appreciation 
of the U.S. dollar relative to other currencies. The higher value of the 
dollar provides competitors with greater opportunity to sell competitively 
in international markets. 
Looking to the 1990s 
Table 2 summarizes the major factors affecting total exports and trade 
shares that have had important effects on U.S. agricultural exports in the 
1970s and early 1980s. In the 1970s, the positive factors overpowered the 
relatively less important negative factors and generated rapid export 
expans1on. In the first half of the 1980s all of these factors have curned 
negative. 
Looking ahead to the last half of the decade, there appears to be one 
ray of hope so far. The dollar has been depreciating in value for much of 
this year and is expected to decline further. There is little hope for 
improvement of che debt problems in the developing countries, and they could 
even get worse before they get better. The other factors are more 
uncertain. The FAPF,I (1985) projections based on the macroeconomic 
forecasts of Wharton Econometrics, and assuming a movement toward market 
oriented loan rates in the United States, do not provide a very bright 
outlook. Even with substantial declines in the value of the dollar and 
continued low commodity prices, U.S. exports by the end of this dec"ade still 
do not recover their peak levels achieved at the beginning of this decade. 
Trade War or Trade Policy? 
As the size of the export pie has stabilized, the conflicts over shares 
of the pie have increased. The most vocal disputes have been between the 
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Table 2. Impact on trade of factors influencing total grain demand and U.S. 
trade shares over three time periods. 
Factors 1970s 1980-85 1985-90 
Total Imports 
Importer's production Negative Negative ? 
Importer's ~ncome growth Positive Negative ? 
Net debt transfer Positive Negative ~egative 
U.S. Trade Share 
U.S. dollar value Positive Negative Positive 
U.S. ag. policies Positive Negative ? 
Competitor ag. policies Negative Negative ? 
United States and the EC over export subsidies, but there have also been 
conflicts with Canada over pork trade and with Japan over market access for 
several commodities. Within the U.S. the growing commodity surplus problem 
and its rapidly rising cost to the Federal Treasury is creating conflict 
between those who would cut agricultural prices free to seek "Competitive" 
levels and those who seek an increase in price and income support. The lack 
of a clear and comprehensive policy on agricultural trade has given rise to 
ad hoc approaches to the problem. Examples of these "trade war" opt ions ar~ 
discussed, and then some ideas on a 11 trade policy 11 approach are suggested. 
Export Subsidies 
There has been much talk and some action concerning export subsidies co 
counter and make more costly the subsidies designed of the EC. The latest 
of these ideas is the export PIK program, where surplus commodities are used 
to subsidize the exports of the same commodity. Unlike a cash subsidy, the 
payment-in-kind has the effect of adding more grain to the market. It is 
not certain that this form of subsidy would enhance domestic market prices, 
since it increases market supplies. Even cash subsidies are oE dubious 
value to a large exporter such as the United States. If such programs are 
limited to targeted markets they will have a negligible impact on total 
exports. If they are applied across the board, the costs could be 
prohibitive. Moreover, providing (at government expense) cheap feed to 
foreign livestock producers while keeping U.S. grain prices at a higher 
level is not likely to be a cost effective means of improving U.S. farm 
~ncome. 
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Retaliation 
Most of the recent export subsidy actions have been directed against 
the EC in retaliation for the export subsidy they have routinely used. 
Aside from scoring political pointS on the homefront and antagonizing an 
ally, it is not clear that these actions have achieved anything. A little 
bit of introspection should tell us that political pressure from outside the 
country is not likely to have much influence on domestic agricultural policy 
decisions. It is the domestic policies in the EC that create the need for 
export subsidies and other surplus disposal programs. Like the United 
States, the EC has been forced in recent years to access its domestic 
agricultural policies because of the increasingly hi~h cost of the programs. 
These pressures have brought about some reduction in the support levels for 
commodities as well as supply adjustment programs for dairy and wine 
production. 
The high levels of price supports maintained by the EC were relatively 
easy to continue as long as the EC was a net importing country. As a net 
exporter of some commodities, it finds itself under a different set of 
pressures that are beginning to have an effect on internal policy decisions. 
A recent study by Xeyers, Thamodaran, and Helmar (1985) found that the 
slowing rate of income growth in importing areas and the appreciation of the 
U.S. dollar had five times more impact on the value of U.S. exports than did 
the increasing level of support prices in the EC. These results suggest 
that while the domestic agricultural policy of the EC has a negative effect 
on U.S. agriculture, it is not likely that a reversal of those policies 
would substantially improve the U.S. export performance. The United States 
and the EC both face substantial surplus capacity problems which were Ln 
part brought on by policies which induced the expansion of productive 
capacity and r~sources in agriculture. Both face serious adjustment 
problems in the years ahead and need to find ways to maintain a vital 
agricultural industry under increasingly difficult bud~et and market 
conditions. 
Trade Policy 
Recognizing the factors that have combined to stifle the growth in U.S. 
exports, it is possible to outline the elements of a trade policy which 
would address this problem. To effect the range of factors enumerated above 
r~quires a trade policy that goes beyond traditional agricultural policy 
boundaries. It needs to recognize that the major growth areas for 
agricultural exports in the future are the developing countries. Many of 
these potential markets are now choked with credit constraints, debt service 
problems, slow economic growth, or all of these. Effective action on these 
problems requires not only a broadly based U.S. policy, but also a 
collaboration with other developed countries. Although mulcilateral 
cooperation is always difficult, enlightened self-interest could motivate 
the EC, Canada, and Australia, for example, to cooperate. 
The primary thrust of the trade policy approach is to restore effective 
demand growth for agricultural commodities. The instruments to increase the 
purchasing power in developing countries would include the macroeconomic 
policies of the Uniced States and other developed countries, the credit 
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policies of private and public institutions in the developed countries, the 
trade policies of developed countries toward the export goods of the 
developing countries, and economic development assistan..:e. Based on- past 
experience, it is likely that North-South trade will be much more effective 
than development assistance in achieving economic gruwth and development in 
the developing countries. 
Some of these initiatives are obviously long-t~rm in nature, but credit 
and trade policies need not take a long time to have a significant effect on 
purchasing power. Such a trade policy approach recognizes once again that 
agriculture has become completely integrated into the domestic and 
international economies and relies heavily upon factors outside of 
agriculture to generate the growth that agri~ulture will need to remain a 
vital sector of the economy in the rest of this decade and beyond. 
Conclusions 
The dramatic turnaround in agricultural exports of the 1980s was the 
result of numerous factors which combined to reduce the growth in world 
trade in the key agricultural commodities as well as the U.S. share of this 
trade. It is a fact of life for a major exporter like the United States 
that export growth is dependent upon growth in total trade. To focus our 
energies and resources on attempts to get a larger share of the shrinking 
pie is a wasteful endeavor. It is always easier fur the small trader tu w1n 
such battles. It is more diffi~ult to formulate a more general, 
comprehensive trade policy to deal with the problem, but that is a task 
that provides some hope for success. 
The conditions that have brought us to this point in the 1980s appear 
likely to continue for the rest of the decade. Grain export demand in the 
next five to ten years is expected to grow rather than decline, but growth 
is likely to be much slower than that of the 1970s. The prospects for the 
United States and the EC and other exporting countries to reach agreements 
on cooperative production adjustment programs or negotiate market shares are 
dim. However, there should exist a mutual interest in restoring effective 
demand for agricultural imports in the developing world. Current unilateral 
export expansion programs by individual countries are short-sighted in their 
focus on increasing market shar~ and have little impact on increasing market 
SlZe. 
A well conceived trade policy that would include improvement of ~redit 
conditions, terms of trade, and development assistance to developing 
countries would be more effective than the sum of the unilateral efforts 
that now exist. The real choice is between a comprehensive long term trade 
policy and a continuation of short-run ad ho~ reactions to trade problems. 
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